Global Oil, Gas, and Energy Sector News for Saturday, 24 January 2026: Oil, Gas, Electricity, Renewables, Coal, Sanctions, Global Energy Markets and Key Trends for Investors and Energy Companies.
Current events in the fuel and energy complex (FEC) as of 24 January 2026 attract the attention of investors and market participants due to their scale and contradictory trends. Geopolitical tensions remain high as the US and EU intensify sanctions in the energy sector, leading to further redistribution of global oil and gas flows. Simultaneously, the global energy markets display a mixed picture. Oil prices have stabilised at moderate levels after falling in 2025, with North Sea Brent trading around $63–65 per barrel and American WTI in the $59–61 range. This is significantly lower than levels a year ago (about $15–20 cheaper than January 2025), reflecting a fragile balance between supply excess and restrained demand. At the same time, the European gas market has faced severe winter cold; rapid fuel withdrawals from underground storage facilities have dropped reserves below 50% capacity, causing a price spike of around 30% since the start of the month. However, the situation is far from an energy crisis like that of 2022 – accumulated reserves and LNG inflows are allowing demand to be met, thus curbing price increases. Meanwhile, the global energy transition is gaining momentum: numerous regions are recording new records in renewable energy generation, though countries still rely on traditional resources to ensure grid stability. In Russia, after last year's spike in fuel prices, authorities have prolonged emergency measures – including export restrictions and subsidies – into early 2026 to stabilise the domestic fuel market. Below is a detailed overview of key news and trends in the oil, gas, electricity, and raw materials sectors as of this date.
Oil Market: OPEC+ Maintains Production Cuts Amid Oversupply Risks
Global oil prices are maintaining relative stability at relatively low levels, influenced by fundamental supply and demand factors. Currently, Brent is trading around $63–65 per barrel, while WTI is within $59–61. Current quotes are 15–20% lower than a year ago, reflecting market saturation following the peaks of 2022–2023 and moderate demand. The dynamics of oil prices are concurrently influenced by several key factors:
- OPEC+ Policy: Concerned about a potential oversupply, the alliance of leading exporters has adopted a cautious approach. At the beginning of January 2026, OPEC+ members confirmed the continuation of existing production restrictions at least until the end of Q1. Major countries (including Saudi Arabia and Russia) extended voluntary cuts in a bid to prevent market saturation amid seasonally low demand. This step reflects a desire to maintain price stability and marks a shift from the production increases observed a year ago.
- Weak Demand Growth: The increase in global oil consumption remains modest. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), demand is expected to rise by only ~0.9 million bpd in 2026 (compared to ~2.5 million bpd in 2023). OPEC forecasts a growth of approximately +1.1 million bpd. Such tempered expectations are related to the slowdown in the global economy and the effect of high prices from previous years, which have stimulated energy-saving practices. Structural factors also play a role, such as slower industrial growth in China and saturation of post-pandemic demand.
- Rising Stocks and Non-OPEC Supply: In 2025, global oil stocks increased significantly – analysts report that commercial crude oil and petroleum product stocks rose by an average of 1–1.5 million barrels per day. This was caused by active production increases outside of OPEC, primarily in the US and Brazil. The American oil industry reached record production levels (around 13 million bpd), while Brazil boosted supplies through new offshore fields. The excess supply has created a 'buffer' in the form of high stocks, which apply downward pressure on prices, despite occasional interruptions (such as temporary export reductions from Kazakhstan or local conflicts in the Middle East).
The cumulative impact of these factors keeps the oil market in a state close to oversupply. Brent and WTI quotations fluctuate within a narrow range, lacking momentum for both new increases and significant declines. Several investment banks forecast that if current trends continue, the average Brent price in 2026 may dip into the $50 range. Nevertheless, market participants continue to closely monitor geopolitical events – sanctions and situations in particular oil-producing countries – that could potentially alter the balance of supply and demand.
Gas Market: Europe Faces Cold, Prices Rise
At the centre of the gas market, Europe is experiencing a significant winter challenge as the year begins. By the start of the heating season, European countries had high stocks: underground gas storage facilities (UGSF) were nearly 100% full by December 2025. However, the prolonged cold in January 2026 accelerated the depletion of these reserves – by the end of the month, the overall level of UGSF in the EU had dropped below 50%. Such rapid gas withdrawals had not been seen for several years, and the market responded with rising prices. Futures at the TTF hub soared to ~€40/MWh (around $500 per thousand cubic meters), whereas they traded around €30/MWh in December.
Despite this considerable spike, current gas prices remain significantly lower than the crisis peaks of 2022, when quotes exceeded €300/MWh. The European market is relatively resilient to demand shocks thanks to the measures taken and external supplies. During the harsh cold, a substantial volume of liquefied natural gas continues to arrive: LNG tankers are being redirected to Europe, compensating for reduced withdrawals from storage. Simultaneously, gas demand has risen in other regions – North America and Asia – also facing abnormal cold. This has led to a global rally in gas prices: in the US, prices at Henry Hub have reached their highest levels since 2022, while the Asian spot index JKM has risen to levels seen at the end of last year. Nevertheless, thanks to established logistics and diversified sourcing, Europe is currently avoiding gas shortages: even with declining reserves, supplies continue from various nations (Norway, North Africa, Qatar, the US, etc.), mitigating the impact of ceasing pipeline gas imports from Russia.
Experts note that after an extremely cold January, European storage facilities may end the winter at significantly lower levels than last year. This will create a new challenge for replenishing these facilities ahead of the next heating season, potentially sustaining prices. Concurrently, the launch of several new LNG projects worldwide in 2026–2027 is expected to increase supply and relieve pressure on the market in the medium term. In the coming weeks, the situation in the gas market will depend on the weather: if February proves milder, price growth is likely to slow, and there should be no issues with remaining reserves. Therefore, even amid current winter stress, the European gas sector demonstrates adaptability, managing the seasonal demand peaks without panic, albeit at somewhat elevated prices.
International Politics: Sanction Pressure and Export Reorientation
Geopolitical factors continue to significantly influence energy markets. At the beginning of 2026, the West is not easing its sanction pressure on the Russian oil and gas sector – instead, new restrictive measures are being implemented. The European Union agreed in December 2025 on a plan to fully and permanently abandon the import of Russian energy resources: specifically, purchases of pipeline gas from the Russian Federation are to be reduced to zero by the end of 2026, and dependence on Russian LNG is also planned to be gradually eliminated. Additionally, the EU has imposed a ban on the import of petroleum products produced from Russian oil at foreign refineries – this measure aims to close loopholes through which Russian oil was indirectly entering the European market in the form of gasoline or diesel fuel processed in third countries.
The United States, for its part, is intensifying its rhetoric and is ready for new actions. The US administration is considering additional sanctions against several countries and companies that assist Moscow in circumventing existing restrictions. Washington has openly warned major purchasing countries (such as China and India) against increasing imports of Russian oil. Initiatives are advancing in Congress to impose high tariffs on goods from countries that actively trade with Russia in energy resources. Although these proposals are still under discussion, the fact that pressure is intensifying increases uncertainty in global oil and gas trade.
In response, Russia continues to reorient its export flows towards friendly markets. Oil and LNG supplies to Asia remain high: China, India, Turkey, and several other countries are the largest buyers of Russian hydrocarbons, benefiting from price discounts. Alternative currencies (yuan, rupee) and payment schemes that reduce dependence on the dollar and euro are increasingly being utilised for settlements. Concurrently, the Russian government has announced plans to develop its own tanker fleet and insurance mechanisms to minimise the impact of Western sanctions on oil export logistics. Another significant event has been the partial normalisation of relations between Russia, Venezuela, and Iran: these oil-producing countries are building coordinated positions in the market, aiming to jointly resist US sanction pressure.
Thus, a confrontation persists on the international stage, affecting energy. Sanctions and countermeasures are forming a new configuration of oil and gas flows: the share of supplies to the West is decreasing, while the Asia-Pacific region is gaining increasing importance. Investors are assessing risks: on one hand, further escalation of sanctions could lead to disruptions and price fluctuations; on the other hand, any hints of dialogue or compromise (e.g., extension of export deals via intermediaries or humanitarian exceptions) could improve market sentiment. For now, the baseline scenario is the continuation of the West's hardline stance and the adaptation of exporters to new realities, which is already factored into prices and forecasts.
Asia: India and China Between Imports and Domestic Production
- India: New Delhi is seeking to strengthen energy security and reduce dependence on hydrocarbon imports while navigating external pressures. Since the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, India has sharply increased its purchases of affordable Russian oil, which has ensured a steady supply of cheap raw materials for the domestic market. However, in 2025, faced with the threat of Western sanctions and tariffs, the Indian government somewhat reduced Russia's share in its oil imports, increasing supplies from the Middle East and other regions. At the same time, India is betting on developing its own resources: as early as August 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the launch of a National Deepwater Oil and Gas Exploration Programme. Within this initiative, the state-owned company ONGC is already drilling ultra-deep wells on the continental shelf, hoping to uncover new reserves. Concurrently, the country is rapidly developing renewable energy (solar and wind power plants) and infrastructure for imported LNG in order to diversify its energy balance. Nevertheless, oil and gas remain the foundation of India’s fuel and energy balance, essential for industrial operations and transportation. India is compelled to delicately balance the benefits of importing cheap fuel against risks of Western sanctions.
- China: The largest economy in Asia continues its path towards energy self-sufficiency, combining increased production of traditional resources with record investments in clean energy. In 2025, China achieved historic highs in internal oil and coal production, striving to meet soaring demand and reduce import dependency. Simultaneously, the share of coal in electricity generation in China has fallen to multi-year lows (~55%), as massive new solar, wind, and hydroelectric capacities are being introduced. Analysts estimate that in the first half of 2025, China installed more renewable generating capacity than the rest of the world combined. This has even led to a reduction in absolute fossil fuel consumption within the country. However, in absolute terms, China's appetite for energy resources remains enormous: in 2025, oil and gas imports remained one of the key sources for meeting demands, particularly in transportation, industry, and chemicals. Beijing continues to actively enter into long-term LNG supply contracts, as well as develop nuclear energy, seeing it as a crucial part of the energy balance. It is expected that in the new 15th Five-Year Development Plan (2026–2030), China will set even more ambitious targets for increasing the share of non-carbon energy. Meanwhile, authorities clearly intend to maintain adequate backup capacity in traditional thermal power plants – Chinese leadership will not allow energy shortages, considering the experience of rolling blackouts in the past decade. As a result, China is pursuing two parallel courses: on one hand, it is rapidly implementing the clean technologies of the future; on the other, it maintains a solid foundation of oil, gas, and coal, ensuring today’s energy system resilience.
Energy Transition: Growth of ‘Green’ Energy and Balance with Traditional Generation
The global shift towards clean energy continues to accelerate, confirming its irreversibility. In 2025, new records in electricity generation from renewable sources (RES) were achieved worldwide. According to preliminary estimates from industry analysts, the combined output from solar and wind energy for the first time surpassed electricity production from all coal power plants combined. This historic milestone was made possible by the explosive growth of RES capacity: for instance, global solar generation surged by approximately 30% compared to the previous year, while wind generation increased by almost 10%. The new ‘green’ kilowatt-hours were able to cover a significant portion of the increase in global electricity demand, allowing in several regions a reduction in fossil fuel combustion.
However, the rapid development of renewable energy comes with challenges. The main challenge is ensuring the reliability of power systems with variable sources. During periods when demand growth exceeds the introduction of 'green' capacity or weather conditions result in low generation (calm periods, droughts, extreme cold), countries are compelled to resort to traditional generation for grid balancing. For example, in 2025, an economic uptick in the US led to a temporary increase in electricity production from coal-fired plants, as existing RES was insufficient to meet the additional demand. In Europe, weak winds and reduced water resources in the summer and autumn of 2025 forced a short-term increase in gas and coal burning to maintain energy supply. By winter 2026, severe cold weather simultaneously in North America and Eurasia caused a spike in electricity consumption for heating – traditional gas and coal plants urgently increased generation to compensate for the decline in RES output. These cases highlight that while the share of solar and wind power remains inconsistent, coal, gas, and, in some areas, nuclear capacity play a back-up role, covering peak loads and preventing outages.
Energy companies and governments across the globe are actively investing in solutions designed to smooth out the variability of 'green' generation. Large-scale energy storage systems (powerful batteries, pumped hydro storage) are being constructed, power grids are being modernised, and intelligent demand management systems are being implemented. All of this enhances the flexibility and resilience of energy systems. Nonetheless, the global energy balance will remain hybrid for the next few years. The rapid growth of RES occurs hand in hand with maintaining a significant role for oil, gas, coal, and nuclear energy, which provide fundamental stability. Experts predict that only by the end of this decade will the share of fossil resources in generation begin to decrease decisively as large new RES capacities come online and climate initiatives are realised. For now, traditional and renewable sources operate in tandem, simultaneously ensuring both progress in decarbonisation and uninterrupted energy supply for the economy.
Coal: Resilient Demand Despite Climate Goals
The global coal market demonstrates just how inertia can characterise energy resource consumption. Despite active efforts at decarbonisation, coal use on the planet remains at record levels. Preliminary data indicate that in 2025, global coal demand grew by approximately 0.5% and reached around 8.85 billion tonnes – a historical maximum. The primary increase occurred in Asian countries. In China, which consumes over half of the world's coal, electricity production from coal-fired plants, while decreasing in relative terms due to record RES capacity additions, remains colossal in absolute volumes. Furthermore, fearing energy deficits, Beijing approved the construction of several new coal-fired power plants in 2025, seeking to create reserve capacity. India and Southeast Asian nations also continue to burn coal actively to ensure growing energy requirements, as alternative generation in many of these regions cannot keep pace with economic growth.
Following sharp price surges in 2022, the coal market transitioned to relative stability in 2025. Energy coal prices at key Asian hubs (e.g., Australian Newcastle) remained significantly below the peak values of the crisis period, although still somewhat above pre-crisis levels. This pricing environment is encouraging major exporting countries to maintain high production and export volumes of coal. Indonesia, Australia, Russia, and South Africa – these leading exporters have increased supply over recent years, helping to meet strong demand and avert market shortages. International experts believe that global coal consumption will plateau by the end of this decade and subsequently begin to decline as climate policies tighten and coal generation is supplanted by renewable energy. However, in the short term, coal still remains a pivotal part of the energy balance for many countries. It provides base load electricity generation and heating for industry, thus until a full replacement emerges, coal-fired power plants continue to play an indispensable role in sustaining the economy.
Russian Oil Products Market: Continued Measures to Stabilise Prices
In Russia's domestic fuel sector, as of early 2026, a relative stabilisation is evident, achieved through unprecedented governmental measures. As early as August–September 2025, wholesale prices for gasoline and diesel in the country were reaching historic records, exceeding the levels of the crisis period in 2023. This was caused by a combination of high summer demand (peak transportation and harvesting season) and constrained fuel supply – among the factors were unscheduled repairs and accidents at several major refineries (including as a result of drone attacks), which reduced gasoline production. Facing the threat of shortages and price shocks for consumers, authorities intervened rapidly in market mechanisms, launching an emergency plan to normalise the situation:
- Export Ban: In mid-August 2025, the Russian government imposed a complete ban on the export of motor gasoline and diesel fuel, extending this to all producers – from independent mini-refineries to major oil companies. This measure has been repeatedly prolonged (most recently until the end of February 2026), returning hundreds of thousands of tonnes of fuel to the domestic market that had previously been shipped abroad monthly.
- Partial Resumption of Supply: Beginning in October 2025, as the domestic market became saturated, strict restrictions began to be gradually eased. Large oil refineries were allowed to resume some export shipments under stringent state control, while export barriers largely remained for smaller traders and intermediaries. Thus, the export channel was opened in a controlled manner to avoid a new price spike domestically. In fact, at the beginning of 2026, the export of oil products from Russia remains partially restricted – authorities deliberately retain volume on the domestic market to ensure its saturation.
- Fuel Distribution Control: One step taken was to enhance control over the movement of oil products within the country. Producers were mandated to prioritise domestic market requirements and mutual exchange purchases between companies were banned (as such deals had previously contributed to heating up market prices). The government, in conjunction with relevant agencies (Ministry of Energy, FAS), developed mechanisms for direct contracts between refineries and gas stations, bypassing market intermediaries. This should ensure a more direct and fair pathway for fuel to retail gas stations, avoiding speculative price increases.
- Subsidisation and ‘Damper’: Financial instruments have been employed to restrain prices. The government has increased budgetary allocations for oil refining enterprises and broadened the application of the damper mechanism (backward excise), which compensates companies for lost revenue when redirecting products to the domestic market instead of exporting. These payments incentivise oil companies to send sufficient volumes of gasoline and diesel to Russian gas stations without fearing significant losses due to missed export revenues.
The entirety of these measures has already yielded tangible results by early 2026. Wholesale prices for fuel have retreated from their peak values, and the growth of retail prices at gas stations has remained moderate – throughout 2025, gasoline and diesel prices increased by an average of 5–6%, approximately in line with overall inflation. A domestic fuel deficit has been avoided: gas stations across the country, including in remote rural areas during the autumn fieldwork peak, have been adequately stocked with fuel. The Russian government has stated that it will continue to maintain strict control over the situation. At the first signs of a new imbalance, new export restrictions may be swiftly implemented, or fuel interventions may occur from state reserves. For energy market participants, such policies entail a degree of predictability in domestic prices, although oil product exporters must contend with partial restrictions. Overall, the stabilisation of the domestic fuel market bolsters confidence that even in the face of external challenges – sanctions and global price volatility – domestic gasoline and diesel prices can be kept within acceptable limits, protecting the interests of consumers and the economy.
