Current News in the Oil, Gas, and Energy Sector as of 13 November 2025: Transactions, Geopolitics, Exports, Oil and Gas Production, the Impact of Sanctions, and Global Market Balance. Insights for Investors and Energy Sector Participants.
Current events in the fuel and energy complex (FEC) as of 13 November 2025 attract the attention of investors and market participants due to their ambiguity. There is still no breakthrough in relations between Russia and the West; on the contrary, the United States has imposed new sanctions against major Russian oil companies, indicating a strengthening of the sanctions confrontation. The global oil market, which had previously been under pressure due to oversupply and slowing demand, remains in a fragile balance: Brent crude prices are hovering around the mid-$60 range (approximately $64–66), reflecting the balance of opposing factors. The European gas market enters winter with record stocks: underground gas storage (UGS) facilities in the EU are over 95% full, providing a reliable reserve and keeping prices at a comparatively moderate level. Meanwhile, the global energy transition reaches new heights, with many countries recording record generation from renewable sources, although traditional resources remain necessary to ensure the stability of energy systems. In Russia, following a surge in fuel prices, authorities are extending the ban on gasoline exports until the end of the year and are restricting diesel exports in an effort to stabilise the domestic market. Below is a detailed overview of key news and trends in the oil, gas, electricity, and raw materials sectors as of the current date.
Oil Market: Threat of Oversupply and Slowing Demand
Global oil prices continue to show relative stability at low levels. The North Sea benchmark Brent is trading around $65 per barrel, while the American WTI is nearing $60. Current prices are approximately 10% lower than a year ago, indicating a gradual normalisation of the market following the extreme peaks of the energy crisis in 2022–2023. The equilibrium is supported by a combination of several factors:
- Increase in OPEC+ production. The oil alliance has been gradually increasing supply since the beginning of the year. By autumn 2025, the aggregate production quota of key participants in the deal has nearly returned to pre-pandemic levels: monthly easing of restrictions since spring has led to an increase in production by several million barrels per day. This increase in supply is already reflected in rising global oil and petroleum product inventories, exerting upward pressure on prices.
- Slowing demand. The growth rate of global oil consumption has significantly decreased. The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts a demand increase in 2025 of only about +0.7 million barrels/day (compared to +2.5 million in 2023). OPEC estimates the demand growth at approximately +1.3 million barrels per day. Economic slowdowns, particularly in China's industrial sector, along with effects from previous high prices, have stimulated energy saving and restrained consumer appetites.
- Geopolitics and sanctions. The prolonged conflict surrounding Ukraine and lack of progress in negotiations mean that sanctions pressure on the Russian oil and gas sector remains, and in some cases, intensifies. In late October, the US administration expanded sanctions for the first time in a long while, adding Russia's largest oil companies to the list. These measures force trading flows to restructure: for instance, Indian refineries have already indicated a readiness to reduce oil purchases from Russia to avoid secondary sanctions. On one hand, these actions increase uncertainty and create a risk premium in oil prices. On the other hand, global supplies continue to be rerouted via alternative routes, and there has not been a direct deficit of raw materials in the market. As a result, oil prices fluctuate within a narrow range, gaining no impetus for either a new rally or a collapse.
The combined influence of these factors creates a moderate oversupply above demand. The market is balancing on the edge of surplus, and exchange prices remain significantly below last year’s highs. Many analysts warn that if current trends continue, the average annual price of Brent could fall to around $50 per barrel by 2026. For now, market participants are adopting a wait-and-see stance, monitoring both fundamental indicators (inventories, production levels) and political signals from OPEC+ and key powers.
Gas Market: Full Storage in Europe Ensures Price Stability
The gas market remains focused on Europe, which has successfully completed the fuel injection season. EU countries have achieved a filling level of over 95% of their gas storage capacity - considerably above the target level of 90% set at the beginning of winter, and a record in recent years. Such a high resilience before the heating season strengthens the region's energy security. By mid-November, in a number of Western European countries, the amount of gas in UGS is roughly equivalent to the amount present a year ago at the peak of winter, which allows for an optimistic outlook for the upcoming cold months.
High reserves and stable liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies support a relatively calm pricing environment in the European gas market. Futures at the Dutch TTF hub are fluctuating around €31–33/MWh (approximately $380 per thousand cubic meters) – significantly lower than the crisis peaks of 2022. Demand and supply in Europe are currently close to balance: moderate consumption and a warm start to autumn have allowed for inventory increases without price spikes. EU importers continue to actively purchase LNG worldwide – regasification terminals are operating at high capacity, receiving tankers from the US, Qatar, Africa, Australia, and other regions. This compensates for the cessation of pipeline supplies from Russia: since January 2025, the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine has been fully halted, and the "Yamal-Europe" pipeline has been closed due to sanctions, leaving the "Turkish Stream" through the Balkans (approximately 50 million cubic meters per day, only a small fraction of previous volumes) as the sole route for pipeline gas from the Russian Federation to the European Union.
As a result of supply diversification, Europe is entering winter with virtually no dependence on Russian gas. Risks, of course, remain: abnormally cold weather might increase fuel consumption, and competition with Asia for spot LNG cargoes could intensify if the economies of China and other regional countries accelerate. Nevertheless, at this point, the balance in the European gas market appears stable, and prices are relatively low. This situation is favourable for the industry and energy sector in Europe ahead of peak loads, reducing the likelihood of price shocks similar to those witnessed in the recent past.
International Politics: Western Energy Partnership and New Sanctions
Western countries are taking coordinated steps to restructure global energy ties amidst geopolitical tensions. In early November, significant agreements were made at the energy forum in Athens, aimed at reducing Russia's influence on the European gas market. For example, the American company ExxonMobil has signed a contract for exploring and producing natural gas in Greek waters in collaboration with local partners. Concurrently, Greece has entered its first long-term contract for LNG imports from the US: starting in 2030, the country will receive at least 0.7 billion cubic meters of LNG per year, with the potential to increase to 2 billion cubic meters. These deals fall within the EU's broader strategy to replace Russian energy resources: in July, the EU and the US concluded a trade agreement in which Europe committed to purchasing around $250 billion per year in American energy resources (oil, gas, nuclear fuel) over the next three years.
American officials have openly stated their intention to displace "every last molecule" of Russian gas from Western European markets. The new energy partnership is already yielding results: the European market has quickly shifted to LNG, with countries like Greece transforming from end consumers of Russian gas into hubs for distributing American fuel across Europe. At the same time, the EU is tightening its own restrictions: a plan for a complete ban on the import of Russian LNG by 2027 has been approved, and earlier bans have been introduced on oil and petroleum products from the Russian Federation. Thus, the energy landscape of Europe is changing rapidly – the share of the US, Middle East, and other alternative suppliers is steadily growing.
However, the increase in sanctions has side effects for market participants. **India**, which has become the largest purchaser of discounted Russian oil, is now forced to reconsider its strategy. In late October, the US added Russian oil companies "Rosneft" and "Lukoil" to its sanctions list, complicating payments with them. Indian refiners, to avoid losing access to the US financial system and falling under secondary sanctions, have expressed their readiness to sharply reduce purchases of crude from these companies. According to traders, some Indian refineries have already suspended the execution of long-term contracts with "Rosneft." These actions could reduce India's overall imports of Russian oil (which reached a record 1.5–1.7 million barrels per day in 2025), and shift Indian demand towards Middle Eastern and African suppliers, albeit at higher prices. Thus, Washington's sanctions pressure is effectively forcing a redistribution of global oil flows: Russian companies have to increase discounts and primarily focus on China, Turkey, and several other countries that have not joined the sanctions.
India and China: Adjusting Imports and Increasing Domestic Production
The largest Asian economies continue to balance between importing energy resources and developing domestic production. **India**, as a result of sanctions pressure, finds itself faced with a choice: preserve profitable purchases of cheap Russian oil or avoid rupturing trade relations with the West. Until recently, India actively increased imports of Russian oil, benefiting from significant discounts (an average of $5–10 compared to Brent for the Urals variety). This allowed Russian oil to account for about 34% of the structure of India's raw material imports. However, the new US sanctions against "Rosneft" and "Lukoil", as well as the threat of high tariffs on Indian goods in the US, compel New Delhi to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. Major Indian oil companies indicate readiness to virtually eliminate purchases from sanctioned Russian producers by early 2026. In the short term, India is substituting the falling volumes with imports from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE) and Africa, although this does lead to a slight increase in raw material costs. Simultaneously, the Indian government is accelerating the development of its own fields: following the announcement in August of a national "deepwater mission" to search for oil and gas, state corporation ONGC has already begun drilling ultra-deep wells in the Andaman Sea. Initial reports indicate promising results, instilling hope for an increase in domestic production and a reduction in import dependence in the future.
**China**, in turn, remains the largest buyer of Russian hydrocarbons, but is simultaneously focusing on increasing its energy base. Beijing has not joined the Western sanctions, taking advantage of the situation to increase imports at reduced prices. Although, as a result of the first three quarters of 2025, China reduced its oil imports from Russia by about 8% compared to last year's record (to ~74 million tonnes over 9 months), Russia still ranks first among oil suppliers to China. At the same time, Chinese companies are actively procuring raw materials from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brazil, and other countries, diversifying their sources. Overall oil imports by the PRC for January to September increased by about 2.5% year-on-year, exceeding 420 million tonnes (approximately 11.3 million barrels per day). Apart from imports, China is increasing domestic production: in the first three quarters of 2025, national producers extracted around 150 million tonnes of oil (+1–2% year-on-year) and about 170 billion cubic meters of natural gas (+5–6% year-on-year). The development of fields, especially offshore and hard-to-reach areas, remains a strategic priority to reduce reliance on external supplies. Nevertheless, the scale of China's economy is such that in the foreseeable future, the country will maintain its status as the largest importer of energy resources: experts estimate that even with increased production, China will still need to cover at least 70% of its oil needs and around 40% of its gas needs through imports. Thus, India and China—two key consumers in Asia—are adapting their energy strategies to the new global reality, combining the search for advantageous import opportunities with efforts to develop domestic production.
Energy Transition: New Records in Renewable Energy and the Role of Traditional Generation
The global transition to clean energy continues to gain momentum in 2025. Many regions have reached impressive milestones in renewable energy. **In Europe**, by the end of 2024, the total electricity generation from solar and wind power plants exceeded generation from coal and gas-fired power plants for the first time, and this trend has continued into 2025. The share of "green" electricity in the EU's energy balance is steadily increasing, displacing coal after a brief resurgence in 2022–2023. **In the US**, renewable sources now provide over 30% of electricity production; total generation from wind and solar at the beginning of 2025 has, for the first time, exceeded output from coal generation. **China** retains its global leadership in installed renewable energy capacity: dozens of gigawatts of new solar panels and wind turbines are brought online each year, smashing previous records. According to the IEA, total investments in the global energy sector in 2025 will exceed $3 trillion, with more than half of these funds directed towards the development of "green" energy, modernising electricity grids, and energy storage systems.
The rapid growth of solar and wind generation presents new challenges for energy infrastructure. Even having reached record levels, renewables remain variable sources – their output depends on weather and time of day. To ensure the reliability of energy supply, countries are required to maintain sufficient capacity in traditional generation. During periods of low renewable output—for example, during calm weather or at night—gas and coal power plants are utilised to cover peak demand. In the past heating season, some European countries occasionally had to temporarily increase the load on coal-fired power plants during windless weather, despite the environmental costs. In response to these challenges, governments and companies are actively investing in the creation of energy storage systems (industrial batteries, pumped hydro storage) and "smart" grids capable of flexibly redistributing loads. Experts predict that by 2026–2027, renewable sources could take the lead globally in terms of generation volume, finally overtaking coal. However, on this path, the need for reserves from traditional power plants, which serve as insurance against outages, will remain for the coming years. Thus, the global energy transition is accompanied by new records and investments, but requires a careful balance between the implementation of "green" technologies and the maintenance of energy system stability.
Coal Sector: High Demand in Asia Amid Stable Prices
Despite the accelerating development of renewables, the global coal market remains a significant segment of the energy balance. Demand for coal in 2025 remains at a high level, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. **China**—the largest consumer and producer of coal—continues to burn immense volumes of fuel. Annual production from China's coal industry exceeds 4 billion tonnes, covering the lion's share of domestic needs. However, during peak demand periods (e.g. hot summers for air conditioning or cold winters for heating), even these colossal volumes are barely sufficient, and China periodically ramps up coal imports from countries like Indonesia, Russia, and Australia to avoid shortages. **India** is also increasing coal consumption alongside economic growth and electrification: national coal production is hitting records, surpassing 900 million tonnes per year, but rapidly rising energy demand necessitates increased imports as well. Other developing countries in Asia (Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh) are commissioning new coal-fired power plants to meet the energy needs of their populations and industries.
Prices for thermal coal in 2025 have stabilised relative to sharp fluctuations witnessed during the global energy crisis. On the key Asian market (Australian Newcastle coal), prices are holding in the range of $130–150 per tonne, significantly lower than the peaks above $400 seen in 2022. This price correction can be explained by the restoration of the balance between supply and demand: increased production in exporting countries (Australia, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa) and a slight decrease in demand in Europe and North America (where there has been a faster exit from coal) offset the consumption increase in Asia. As a result, the global coal market has entered a phase of relative stability. Nevertheless, environmental restrictions and investments in clean energy are gradually limiting long-term growth prospects for coal demand. It is anticipated that global coal consumption will plateau in the coming years and then slowly start to decline as many countries implement their decarbonisation goals. For the time being, coal continues to play a significant role, providing base generation and industrial production, especially in developing economies.
Russian Fuel Market: Extension of Export Restrictions to Stabilise Prices
In the second half of 2025, a package of measures is being implemented to normalise the pricing situation in the Russian fuel market. In September and October, there was a noticeable decline in wholesale prices for gasoline and diesel fuel after a surge during the previous summer. The Russian government, seeking to prevent shortages and a new price spike, extended temporary restrictions on fuel exports. In particular, the previously implemented ban on the export of automotive gasoline for all producing companies and trading intermediaries was first extended through September and then renewed until the end of the current year. Concurrently, from autumn, restrictions on diesel fuel exports for independent traders without their own production have been introduced—this measure is aimed at closing loopholes for the export of scarce fuel abroad. According to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, these steps should guarantee the prioritisation of domestic market supply with petroleum products.
Thanks to the adopted package of decisions, the situation at filling stations has stabilised significantly. Exchange prices for gasoline and diesel have retreated from peak levels, while retail prices have been rising at moderate rates—approximately 5–6% since the beginning of the year, which is close to overall inflation. Filling stations across the country have sufficient fuel volumes, including the completion of the harvesting campaign and the onset of the winter season. The government has also increased subsidised fuel sales volumes in the domestic market and tightened control over the sale of petroleum products to prevent repeat scenarios of sharp price increases in spring and summer. Long-term measures—such as raising export duties and adjusting the damping mechanism—are also being discussed to create a more resilient supply system for the domestic market.
As a result of the efforts undertaken, the internal fuel market of the Russian Federation has entered the winter period in a relatively balanced state. Authorities have successfully quelled price hysteria and created a reserves of fuel stocks. Market participants note that the further dynamics of prices will depend on the situation in the global market (exchange rate of the rouble, oil prices) and on the discipline in the enforcement of imposed restrictions. Nevertheless, for the time being, the Russian fuel sector shows signs of stabilisation, which is particularly important for the economy and population during the season of increased energy consumption.
