The EC also announced new sanctions targeting the Russian shadow fleet: in addition to the 632 vessels already on the EU sanctions list, 30 new vessels will be added, the names of which remain undisclosed.
For the first time, restrictions will be introduced on vessels providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services (fuel supply). Furthermore, limitations could be enforced against ports and airports facilitating the sale of Russian oil, as well as oil refineries using raw materials from Russia. Finally, the sale of LNG tankers to Russia will be restricted.
Restrictions on LNG Carriers
EU countries have never sold liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers to Russia. The export projects of NOVATEK, namely "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2", operate vessels built in South Korea. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, named "Alexey Kosygin", was built and delivered to the customer by the Russian shipyard SSK "Zvezda" at the end of 2025.
Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the petroleum products marketplace Open Oil Market, noted that most of the tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by the South Korean Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "It is possible that the EU is attempting to retroactively close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation. However, such a loophole would be difficult to exploit given the overall sanctions landscape," he said.
The Centre for Price Indices (CPI) pointed out that there are no shipyards in the EU for building tankers, but there are shipyards for their maintenance, particularly in Denmark. "It is possible that sanctions will include maintenance and repair of Russian LNG carriers," they speculated. The CPI believes that the new measures are intended to "pressure" all consumers of Russian oil, including major buyers like China, India, and Turkey.
Dmitry Kasatkin, managing partner at Kasatkin Consulting, argues that the primary risks related to LNG are less about direct supplies of new ships from Europe and more about services for the existing fleet — maintenance, insurance, and servicing of vessels. "For already operational LNG projects, there will be no effect unless sanctions target existing long-term contracts and vessel servicing. This measure may be more sensitive for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialised ice-class LNG carriers are difficult to replace: they are expensive, scarce, and technologically complex. However, again, this is more likely to complicate supply chains than lead to an inability to purchase an LNG carrier," he opines.
Konstantin Pozdnyakov, advisor to the rector of RGSU and doctor of economic sciences, noted that the restrictions on the supply of LNG carriers include a ban on technical maintenance of Russian vessels for transporting liquefied gas, and that as of January 2027, it will become illegal to provide terminal services for Russian LNG, which will create difficulties for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He believes that companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet (primarily bunkering vessels for refuelling ships at sea) as well as technical support vessel operators and insurance companies will be the most vulnerable. For shipowners, this represents a significant increase in compliance risks, as even the one-off provision of services to a tanker from the shadow fleet could lead to inclusion in sanctions lists and loss of access to European ports and financial services, the expert asserts.
Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports
Kasatkin believes that the impact on Russian service vessels operating with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, this entails increased risks, higher insurance costs, and complexities with chartering, repairs, and port access. However, for the established logistics, the blow is not critical: chains can be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points.
Tereshkin posits that sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet could, theoretically, complicate oil export logistics temporarily. However, this will not have a long-term effect due to the regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of some tankers following a sharp easing of sanctions on Venezuela.
Commenting on potential sanctions against foreign maritime ports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and petroleum products are primarily exported through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructure, including ports in Western India, oil terminals in China's Shandong province and the eastern coastline, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as various transshipment and blending hubs in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov suggests that the main recipients of Russian oil from 2024–2026, following the introduction of the European embargo, will be India and China. "The key unloading ports will be India's Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals servicing independent refineries," the expert clarified.
Sanctions against ports and refineries operating with Russian raw materials could theoretically impact major Indian and Turkish enterprises, but the EU does not have direct leverage over infrastructure objects in third countries," Pozdnyakov points out. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such facilities, but are unlikely to lead to a halt in supplies," Kasatkin added. "These measures are not directly targeting the end consumer of Russian oil, and the further the sanctions restriction is from the end consumer, the less transparent the chain becomes and the easier it is to restructure." There is likely to be no effect on airports at all, he noted. "An important question is how all these restrictions will be enforced and controlled; we assume that for the EU, Asian markets are opaque and enforcement of sanctions will be quite formal," Kasatkin states.
Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions may be sensitive for Turkish refineries that use Russian oil for producing petroleum products and subsequent fuel supplies to Europe. "The EU has already imposed restrictions on the import of petroleum products produced using Russian oil. However, tracing such a ban is quite difficult, which is why new restrictions are being introduced, raising risks for refineries working with Russian raw materials," he explained.
"Indian and Turkish refineries will face a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to procure discounted Russian raw materials," explains Pozdnyakov. "Many may prefer to redirect their export streams to the growing Asian market. The long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the EU, the US, and the UK." For Russian exports, he says, the new sanctions mean further increases in logistics costs and the need to develop marine transport infrastructure without European contractors.
Source: RBC
