Currently, our retail market has not reacted to the mass drone attacks on Russian oil refineries (NПЗ) that occurred in May of this year. Oil companies and large traders have fuel reserves in storage facilities, and large and mid-sized petrol station networks typically purchase fuel in advance. Furthermore, everyone recalls the spring of the year before last, when the first attacks on Russian NПЗ began. At that time, the element of surprise was significant, and the risk of fuel shortages was real; however, now any potential disruption to supplies from any source is accounted for—companies are taking precautions.
The Ministry of Energy emphasises that the domestic market is sufficiently supplied with petrol, DТ, and aviation kerosene, and the logistical infrastructure is functioning steadily, with no interruptions in regional supply reported.
However, the impact of attacks on NПЗ may be delayed and will depend on how long and to what extent production has been reduced due to unscheduled repairs. Since the beginning of this year, drones have attacked nearly all major NПЗ in the European part of Russia. Notably, from early May, the attacked facilities primarily catered to the domestic market (Moscow and the surrounding region, Central Russia, the Northwest, the South, the Volga region, the Urals, and Western Siberia). According to Reuters, production was halted or reduced at three of Russia's largest NПЗ.
Information regarding fuel production is scarce, as it is tightly controlled, and there is no operational statistical data available. However, energy expert Kirill Rodionov provided "RG" with data from "OMT-Consult" for the first quarter of 2026, which predated the most intense assaults on our NПЗ. According to this data, from January to March of this year, petrol production decreased by 4.8% compared to the same period in 2025. Crude oil processing at the NПЗ dropped by 1.6% year-on-year to 64.1 million tonnes, down from 65.2 million tonnes in the first quarter of 2025 and 66.4 million tonnes from January to March 2024.
At present, we are only discussing petrol because production exceeds domestic market demand by a mere 10-15%. In 2024, Russia produced 41.1 million tonnes of petrol, of which 37 million tonnes were needed for domestic consumption. Currently, petrol exports from Russia are banned for all. Deliveries are conducted only through intergovernmental agreements with EAEU countries. A production decrease of less than 5% should not be critical. However, at the end of April, Bloomberg reported, citing OilX data, that Russian oil refining volumes had fallen by 10-12%. This did not even account for the damage sustained by NПЗ in May. Therefore, the current calm and stability in the domestic fuel market will depend entirely on the speed of NПЗ repairs and the adequacy of fuel reserves in storage.
According to Sergey Frolov, managing partner at NEFT Research, the threat of a fuel shortage is real and significant. The severity of the crisis will depend on the swiftness and completeness of measures taken by the regulator, as well as by oil companies. However, the unpredictability factor is very high—attempts to attack NПЗ and oil bases occur on an almost daily basis. While there is a fuel reserve available, it is intended to address tactical shortages. Without specific measures being taken, these reserves will not be sustainable for long, according to the expert.
In contrast, CEO of Open Oil Market Sergey Tereshkin is more optimistic. He believes it is too early to say that the increased risks to fuel infrastructure in Central Russia will lead to a physical fuel shortage. However, he anticipates a likely reduction in petrol supply on the exchange. This includes risks related to the non-fulfilment of contracts secured on the exchange previously.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Russian NПЗ utilize foreign, primarily European, equipment, which is currently inaccessible to us, at least for direct purchases. If this equipment suffers damage as a result of the attacks, the repair time will depend less on the scale of the work and more on the logistics of acquiring the necessary components.
It is not feasible to construct a new NПЗ in a month, and thus, in a critical situation, there may be a need for petrol imports, although there are limited supplier options. As Tereshkin points out, imports from Belarus alone will be insufficient as its petrol production (around 3 million tonnes per year) accounts for less than 10% of domestic demand in Russia. Securing imports would be simpler if Kazakhstan had realised the project for the construction of a fourth large NПЗ (in addition to the existing three). However, this project is still at the discussion stage.
China is also an option, but the logistics for such supplies are severely lacking, both in terms of cost and delivery speed. It is no coincidence that Frolov emphasises that mere imports will not suffice; a comprehensive set of measures is necessary.
Tereshkin believes that the heightened risk of shortages will likely result in petrol price increases outpacing inflation rates. Currently, petrol prices have already surpassed inflation at 4% compared to 3.15%. Furthermore, the peak demand season is still ahead, expected to occur in July and August.
The situation with diesel is more favourable. In Russia, diesel production is almost double the amount required for domestic consumption. However, experts do not rule out that local supply disruptions may occur due to the uneven distribution of NПЗ across Russia and transport restrictions in light of emergency plant shutdowns.
From the perspective of fuel market development strategy, Dmitry Gusev, vice-chairman of the Supervisory Board of the "Reliable Partner" Association and member of the Expert Council for the "Russian Petrol Stations" competition, expressed his views to "RG." He emphasised that 90-95% of passenger vehicles in Russia run on petrol. This creates risks for our national security as we are critically dependent on a single category of goods that may start to become scarce. Economic incentives to build new NПЗ have not yet been established; thus, the expert sees the only solution as a reduction in dependence on petrol. Alternatives could include DТ, liquefied hydrocarbon gases (LHG), and electric vehicles. This change could be achieved through simple stimulating measures—by cancelling fees and taxes for non-petrol-engine vehicles and through administrative decisions favouring the production of new non-petrol vehicles in Russia.
Source: RG.RU
