Foreign States' Debt to Russia Rises to $33.1 Billion — A 26-Year High. An Analysis of Major Debtor Countries, the Role of the CIS, and Investment Risks for Global Investors.
Foreign states' debt to Russia grew by $2.6 billion in 2024, reaching $33.1 billion — the highest level since 1998. This assessment has been provided by the World Bank, noting that Russian lending to foreign partners is actively expanding despite sanctions pressure. Moscow has become a notable creditor for several developing countries, increasing the issuance of state loans and export credits.
According to the World Bank, by the end of 2024, 38 countries had debts to Russia. For the first time in decades, the largest debtor is not a CIS country: Bangladesh surpassed Belarus and took the lead with a debt of $7.8 billion. Belarus' debt has decreased to $7.6 billion, placing it in second position. The top five largest borrowers also include India ($4.9 billion), Egypt ($4.1 billion), and Vietnam ($1.4 billion).
A New Debt Record and Historical Context
The volume of external debts to Russia has reached a record level for the post-Soviet period. The previous peak occurred in 1998 when the debt of foreign states amounted to approximately $38 billion. However, at the end of the 1990s, a significant portion of this amount was a legacy of the Soviet era and was subsequently restructured or written off. In the 2000s, Moscow carried out extensive debt cancellations for developing countries — estimates suggest that over $100 billion was forgiven to states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America under initiatives aimed at easing debt burdens and strengthening diplomatic ties.
Thanks to the cancellations of older debts, the total debt to Russia significantly decreased by the 2010s. The current increase to $33 billion is primarily due to new loans issued by Russia over the past decade. Unlike the Soviet era, modern loans are targeted — they are aimed at funding specific projects and supporting allies. Thus, the current record level of debt reflects Russia's active role as a creditor in new geopolitical conditions.
Top 5 Largest Debtors to Russia
The majority of the debt is concentrated in a few countries. By the end of 2024, the five largest borrowers accounted for nearly 80% of the total debt to Russia. The leaders are as follows:
- Bangladesh — $7.8 billion (an increase of $1.2 billion over one year)
- Belarus — $7.6 billion (a decrease of $125 million over one year)
- India — $4.9 billion (an increase of $799 million over one year)
- Egypt — $4.1 billion (an increase of $815 million over one year)
- Vietnam — $1.4 billion (unchanged over one year)
In comparison, the smallest debt to Russia is held by the small island nation of Grenada — only around $2,000, which indicates full repayment or is of a symbolic nature. The contrast between the largest and smallest debtors highlights the concentration of the Russian credit portfolio: the two leading countries (Bangladesh and Belarus) together account for nearly half of all debt to Russia.
CIS Countries: The Importance of Neighbours and Allies
Until recently, it was the CIS countries that topped the list of Russia's debtors. Belarus had long remained the largest borrower, regularly attracting Russian loans to support its budget and implement joint projects. Its current second place ($7.6 billion in debt) reflects the continuation of close financial ties between Minsk and Moscow, although the slight decrease in debt in 2024 indicates that Minsk has begun to repay some obligations.
Other states in the post-Soviet space have substantially smaller debts to Russia. For example, Uzbekistan increased its debt in 2024 by only $39 million — likely due to tapping into new credit lines for infrastructure projects. Caucasian countries have almost eliminated their debts: Georgia, for instance, fully repaid its remaining historic debt to Russia in 2025. Overall, the share of CIS countries in the total external debt to Russia has diminished, yielding to countries in Asia and Africa; however, for key allies — such as Belarus — Russian loans remain critically important.
Export Projects and Strategic Interests
The growth of debt from countries to Russia is driven by a targeted lending policy that serves both economic and geopolitical purposes. A significant portion of Russian loans is tied to specific projects, such as the construction of nuclear power plants. Bangladesh received funding from Russia for the construction of the Ruppur Nuclear Power Plant — this explains the rapid growth of its debt by almost 19% over the year. Similarly, Egypt is increasing its borrowings for the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant project and other infrastructures, leading to a 24% increase in its debt in 2024. Such projects provide Russian companies (particularly Rosatom) with substantial export contracts and long-term presence in partner markets.
Another driver is loans for the purchase of Russian products, primarily military equipment. India — a traditional buyer of Russian weapons — increased its debt by nearly $800 million over the past year, likely in connection with payments for air defence systems and other equipment on deferred payment terms. Likewise, Vietnam and Egypt have received state export credits for military equipment in previous years. Thus, by lending to foreign clients, Moscow supports the export of its high-tech goods and strengthens defence cooperation.
Financial Risks and Investment Aspects
For Russia, providing loans to other states is a form of investment, albeit one fraught with risks. Loans are typically issued on concessionary terms: for instance, loans for nuclear power plants have long grace periods and relatively low interest rates. This helps partners service their debt, but means moderate returns for the lender. Nevertheless, such loans are tied to future fuel supplies, equipment servicing, and other ancillary services, creating long-term profit sources for Russian companies.
However, the risks of non-repayment remain. Some of Russia's borrowers are experiencing debt burdens and economic difficulties. Egypt, for instance, is facing a currency shortage, while Belarus' economy largely depends on support from Moscow. In the event of defaults or the need for restructuring, the Russian budget would have to absorb the costs, as has already occurred with the debts of several countries. At the same time, the overall volume of such assets ($33 billion) is not yet critical for the Russian economy (less than 2% of GDP), but it is noticeably increasing. Investors must take into account that the increase in external credits is part of Russia's strategy to enhance influence, which carries a price in the form of frozen capital and potential losses in adverse scenarios.
Prospects: Further Growth of the Credit Portfolio
Judging by the budget plans, Russia has no intention of reducing the volume of external lending. For the years 2026-2028, the federal budget allocates about 1.8 trillion rubles (approximately $18.5 billion) for the provision of state and export credits to foreign states — a 14% increase compared to earlier plans. Such resources will primarily be directed to "friendly" countries to finance infrastructure projects, supply equipment, and other needs.
If all planned loans are realised, the total debt to Russia could reach new historical highs in the coming years, exceeding levels from the late 1990s. This would strengthen Moscow's presence in the economies of its partners while simultaneously increasing potential risks of non-payment. Global investors must closely monitor this dynamic: the expansion of the Russian credit portfolio reflects a redistribution of financial influences in the world — from traditional Western donors towards new creditors, such as Russia and China. For borrower countries, Russian money is becoming an alternative source of development, while for Moscow, it serves as a tool of "soft power" and the expansion of economic influence.
