The complete ban affects not only traders (commercial companies) but also direct producers - oil refineries (ORs). A full ban on petrol exports was initially imposed from 31 August 2025 and, with several extensions, was in effect until 1 February of this year. Since 1 February, refineries gained permission to export petrol abroad. However, as it appears, this was only a temporary measure.
The return of a full ban was anticipated. The rise in prices on exchanges and in retail accelerated in March, driven traditionally by the seasonal increase in demand and, unusually, by developments in the Middle East, which pushed global oil and petroleum product prices to multi-year highs. In Russia, from late February onwards, exchange prices for petrol peaked at a 16% increase, while diesel fuel (DF) rose by 22%. Presently, quotes have slightly softened, which is likely related to the initial news regarding the total export ban.
At retail, price increases will stall, but this will not lead to a significant drop in prices.However, the government is primarily focused on retail. The average cost of petrol at filling stations has risen by 2.77% since the end of last year. The rate of increase has, in fact, kept pace with the average inflation rate across the country, which reached 2.78% as of 23 March.
The reaction to the export ban, according to experts surveyed by "RG", will be unequivocal. Exchange prices are likely to slow their growth, and may even decline slightly. At retail, price increases will pause, but substantial price cuts are not expected. Their dynamics will align with inflation, but no more than that. However, with the end of summer and autumn approaching, prices tend to rise significantly faster than in spring.
The export ban leaves producers with no choice regarding whom to sell their product. Previously, there was an external market, where prices were higher, and an internal market, where prices were lower; now the choice is eliminated. Moreover, with the external market closed, all volumes intended for it remain within the country—supply outstrips demand. This means that producers have no option but to lower prices, albeit temporarily.
In a conversation with "RG", Yuri Stankevich, Deputy Chair of the State Duma Energy Committee, noted that the export ban is a rapid-response tool that can temporarily stabilize the market but does not address structural issues. For consumers, it means a pause in price increases rather than any significant decline. For the industry, it adds another layer of uncertainty.
Everything has now changed—from supply direction to geopolitics. According to Dmitry Gusev, Deputy Chair of the Supervisory Board of the "Reliable Partner" Association and a member of the Expert Council for the "Russian Filling Stations" competition, the complete ban on exports is necessary from a market stabilisation perspective but strategically misguided. Instead of stimulating refining and creating conditions that encourage oil companies to enhance the depth and volume of refining, we are closing off export options. We are becoming unreliable suppliers of petroleum products in foreign markets. Given current prices, we are not profiting from petroleum products as we could; we are forced to earn solely on crude oil.
As noted by Sergey Frolov, Managing Partner of NEFT Research, in the unpredictable situation of potential unscheduled refinery shut-downs, coupled with a lack of substantial production reserves for petrol and seasonal demand spikes, an export ban can only slow price increases. Significant declines in price should not be anticipated. This applies to both wholesale and retail sectors.
The key issue is that, from a profitability perspective, most large refineries in our country have historically been oriented not towards the domestic market but towards exports. This is largely due to the fact that we export half of the oil and petroleum products produced in our country. Exporting refined products with added value is significantly more profitable than exporting raw materials. This viewpoint has been fostered by the fiscal policy of the state. The large tax manoeuvre (LTM) reduced export duty on oil and light petroleum products (petrol, diesel, jet fuel) to zero (ending in 2024) while increasing levies on gross oil production. In other words, once oil is extracted, taxes are paid, and the added value is obtained from producing petrol and DF sent for export.
While export bans can temporarily mitigate the periodic fuel crises within the country, the only remedy is to increase petrol and DF production. When there is adequate supply for both external and domestic markets—of which there are resources available—no investor will commit funds to constructing a new refinery knowing that their market outlet, or profit-making potential, could be curtailed at any moment.
Frolov points out that since the initiation of the tax manoeuvre, investments in refining have already been unattractive, and amid unpredictable geopolitical dynamics, the investment appeal for refining remains in negative territory.
Refining is a capital-intensive business with a long investment cycle, highlights Stankevich. The sector is highly interested in predictable export and tax policies, stable margins, and consistent transport infrastructure operations. When export channels are intermittently closed—especially during favourable external conditions—companies lose earnings, inevitably diminishing the return on investments in modernising refineries and restoring them after continuous drone attacks, he believes.
In the short term, such bans can demotivate the increase in fuel production if domestic prices become less attractive compared to export alternatives. In the long run, increased refining capacity is achieved not through bans but through technological modernisation, tax incentives, stable export arrangements, and the development of domestic demand, argues Stankevich.
According to Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, the sector as a whole requires new solutions to enhance the profitability of refining and thereby alleviate price pressures. One option could be to reduce the size of excise duties on the “federal” share: currently, 74.9% of excise tax revenues from petrol and diesel go to regional budgets, while 25.1% goes to the federal budget. A quarter reduction in excise duties would improve the economics of refining. Regarding the investment prospects within the sector, ensuring the security of fuel infrastructure and lifting external restrictions on the import of equipment for refineries are critical. Without these, companies will find it challenging to sustainably increase fuel production, and regulators will struggle to maintain price stability.
Source: RG.RU
