The global press seems to have adopted a new form of geopolitical responsibility: declaring wars just as politicians begin to fasten their ties. The situation between Venezuela and the United States serves as a classic example of this media spectacle. Headlines screamed of an imminent invasion and an "oil war," yet in reality, we witnessed a carefully orchestrated act of political pressure, augmented by airborne naval forces and tanker convoys. The war that was so fervently announced on social media and in the news has not materialised. Instead of a full-scale operation, we have witnessed a "escort" thriller unfold in the Caribbean Sea. It is no wonder; rattling sabres is indeed more convenient today than sitting in trenches, and as far as markets, including oil, they have long since learned to differentiate between noise and genuine threat.
Geopolitical tensions reached a peak amid reports of a possible "complete and total blockade" of Venezuela, as promised by Donald Trump. The US President did not mince his words, declaring that Washington intends to reclaim rights to Venezuelan oil that were "illegally taken" by local authorities during nationalisation.
In light of these statements, tangible "hawks" appeared in the Caribbean skies: the US naval aviation was demonstratively deployed. Flightradar24 data recorded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, two Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, and the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft in the airspace. This array of equipment, presented as "ready to strike," is, in fact, a standard show of force under the banner of "diplomacy of pressure."
Caracas responded in kind and quite practically, playing its own card: military escort.
Western media reported that tankers carrying oil by-products (carbamide, petroleum coke) from the José port headed towards Asia under the protection of the Venezuelan Navy. The state-owned company PDVSA hastened to assure that its vessels are fully safe and exercising their legitimate right to free navigation.
Apocalypse enthusiasts were left disappointed: Trump addressed his fellow citizens, criticising the previous administration, praising himself, but did not declare war on Venezuela. Instead of an invasion, there was a pause; instead of an operation, rhetoric about "restoring justice" and reclaiming "stolen" assets, reminiscent of the nationalisation history initiated during Hugo Chávez's time, emerged.
It is noteworthy that domestic support for a forceful scenario within the US is minimal. A Quinnipiac University poll revealed that two-thirds of Americans (63%) oppose an invasion of Venezuela, reducing political risks for the White House. Politically, rattling sabres is safe, but entering the trenches is extremely disadvantageous. This entire geopolitical drama would hold relevance if Venezuela retained its role as a major supplier. However, the figures tell a different story, which is precisely why the oil market did not succumb to panic. "No serious upheaval in the oil market is expected, as Venezuela has reduced its oil production by more than three times over the past two decades – from 3.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2004 to 910 thousand b/d in 2024," stated Sergey Tereshkin, General Director of Open Oil Market, to Vgudok. "In comparison, global oil and gas condensate production in 2024 is expected to be 82.8 million barrels per day (excluding light hydrocarbons).
Venezuela has lost its position as the largest oil producer in South America; Brazil now holds that title, while Guyana and Argentina are actively increasing their productions... Therefore, sharp fluctuations in oil prices are unlikely: in the coming weeks, Brent prices will hover around $60 per barrel, and next year quotes may dip to $55 per barrel."
Thus, Venezuela's share constitutes only about 1% of global supplies, which minimises the short-term impact on prices.
Independent expert Kirill Rodionov concurs, emphasising that the effect on prices will be short-lived and weak:
"If there is any effect on prices, it will last for 1-2 days, and fluctuations will not exceed 1-2 dollars per barrel. For the market as a whole, this is not a very important story."
However, if global prices remain stable, it does not mean that the tension does not come at a cost.
The geopolitical game translates into direct costs for logistics and insurance. The presence of naval aviation and threats of a blockade compel shipowners to avoid risky routes, raise freight rates, and, crucially, increase insurance premiums. The "oil war" does not impact stock prices but rather affects the margins of Venezuelan exporters and the logistical costs for buyers.
The current crisis concerns not a collapse but prospects. Experts agree that this show of force could serve as a prologue to the long-awaited and extensive economic transformation of Venezuela.
"I expect these events to serve as a prologue to Venezuela's full return to the oil market. It is worth noting that oil production in the country now amounts to less than 1 million barrels per day, whereas in the mid-2000s it exceeded 3 million barrels," continues Kirill Rodionov. "Caracas will gradually increase oil production, likely due to the demonopolisation of PDVSA, resulting in several independent companies being created based on this entity, with capital including American firms and investments... I am confident that within the next 10 years, Venezuela could become another significant source of oil production growth and return to the production levels of the mid-2000s."
The reasoning behind this move lies in the catastrophic state of the industry. Experts draw historical analogies; according to Mr. Rodionov, Venezuela is currently experiencing a breakdown in its oil sector even more severe than that which the USSR faced in the late 1980s. Back then, the Russian government was forced to resort to loans from the World Bank in 1992 to rehabilitate oil production. Venezuela's oil industry is approximately in such a state now.
"This situation can be relatively easily 'treated,' including through reducing the tax burden, lifting sanctions, privatising the sector, and lifting export restrictions. You essentially privatise the oil industry, demonopolise it, and invite the best oil service companies, and oil production is quickly restored. And the changes that have long been necessary are already occurring in the country," says Mr. Rodionov.
In the short term, the threat to Russian oil exports is minimal – the volumes from Venezuela are insignificant, and logistical issues can be compensated for within weeks.
However, if the recovery plan succeeds and Venezuela returns to producing 3 million barrels per day within 5–10 years, this will intensify competition.
The emergence of an additional one to two million barrels of oil, similar to Russian grades, could complicate the situation for domestic exporters in Asian markets. Russia will need to account for this new factor in its sales strategies and pricing.
Trump enjoys playing the role of peacemaker. The losses incurred by American companies date back almost two decades. The Venezuelan oil industry was officially nationalised for the first time on January 1, 1976, with all foreign oil companies operating in the country being replaced by Venezuelan counterparts.
The state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) was established, which still exists today. In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez conducted a second nationalisation, affecting not only local companies but also the subsidiaries of Western oil companies – American Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, British BP, French Total, and Norwegian Statoil. Chávez's decision sparked outrage among the US and other Western nations, which responded by imposing the first stringent sanctions against Venezuela, leading to a production crisis.
Furthermore, it can be assumed that Maduro's army and navy possess a solid arsenal of Russian-manufactured anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and it is unlikely that the US president would want to experiment by testing how well the South American "compañeros" have learned to utilise them.
For now, this situation resembles more of a geopolitical spectacle, meticulously orchestrated for a media series rather than a real oil war. Tanker escorts and naval aviation are serious gestures, but without public support and a willingness for direct intervention, they remain elements of negotiation. The market, in the meantime, counts barrels rather than words, and is waiting for the noise to be replaced by actual privatisation. The "war" that journalists love to declare could in fact be the prologue to a new phase in the development of the oil industry.
Source: Vgudok
